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ABSTRACT
We propose a market design solution for a market for distributed
data. The main challenges addressed by our solution are (1) differ-
ent data providers produce different databases that can be joined
to produce answers for users’ queries; (2) data providers have high
fixed costs for producing their databases; and (3) buyers and sellers
can arrive dynamically to the market. Our design relies on using a
Markov chain with states corresponding to different numbers of
allocated databases. The transition probabilities between different
states are governed by the payments suggested by the market plat-
form to the data providers. The main challenge in this setting is
to guarantee dynamic incentive compatibility, i.e., to ensure that
buyers and sellers are not incentivized to arrive late to the market
or to misreport their costs or values. To achieve this, we disentangle
the payments suggested by the market platform to the sellers from
the posted prices exposed to the buyers. We prove that the buyer-
optimal payments that are exposed to sellers are non-increasing
which prevents late arrivals of sellers. Further, we demonstrate that
the posted prices exposed to buyers constitute a martingale process
(i.e., late arrivals lead to the same expected price). Finally, we show
that our design guarantees zero expected average budget deficit
and we perform a number of simulations to validate our model.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Applied computing→ Economics; Marketing;
KEYWORDS
Market Design, Data Markets, Dynamic Markets
ACM Reference Format:
Dmitry Moor. 2019. Data Markets with Dynamic Arrival of Buyers and
Sellers. In The 14th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and
Computation (NetEcon’19), June 28, 2019, Phoenix, AZ, USA. ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 9 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3338506.3340270
1 INTRODUCTION
Many datasets on the Web are unstructured. This means that they
can be easily interpreted by humans but not by machines. Imposing
some structure on the data by publishing it as a database and linking
it to other databases can help machines to make sense of the content
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of the data. This significantly reduces the effort of humans for
the search, analysis and making predictions based on this data
by delegating many of these tasks to the machine. This naturally
results in great benefits for society (see Bernstein et al. [2016]).
The technology for producing and querying such structured and
distributed data already exists and used in numerous areas (e.g.,
[W3C 2014]). Despite of all its potential benefits, this technology is
not highly utilized. One of the reasons for that is the lack of finan-
cial incentives of data providers to publish their data in a structured
format. This happens because the high fixed costs that the data
providers incur for producing their databases, structuring the data
and linking it to the datasets of other data providers can never be
recouped, [Moor et al. 2019]. As a result, a different system of in-
centives is required to compensate the data providers. In this paper,
we propose such a system by designing a market for distributed
data.
1.1 Call for Data Markets
In recent years, there were numerous attempts to design a market
for data. Koutris et al. [2015] aim at designing a market for selling
different views of a database while satisfying a no-arbitrage con-
straint. However, their approach does not easily extend to domains
when users join data produced by multiple data providers.
Moor et al. [2015, 2019] and Agarwal et al. [2019] emphasize the
importance of joining data coming from different data providers.
They argue that the combinatorial preferences of buyers is a crucial
feature for data markets as many databases can complement each
other. As a result, the buyer who can access more databases gets a
more precise and thus, valuable answer for his query.
However, none of these studies consider the dynamics of the data
market. While in many combinatorial markets the dynamics may
not play a critical role, data markets are inherently dynamic.1 This
means that both buyers and sellers in these markets arrive regularly
and can strategically delay their arrivals if they expect to be better
off by doing so. Due to the combinatorial nature of preferences of
buyers such delays can have a dramatic effect on the operation of
the market. Indeed, the late arrivals of sellers may result in a very
low surplus reached by the buyers who arrive earlier and thus, can
access only very few databases. In our work, we focus on both of
these aspects, i.e., on the complementary nature of the data and on
the dynamics of the market.
1.2 Overview of our approach
In this paper, we propose a model for a dynamic data market. We
focus on the following challenges: (1) the data providers have high
1For example, combinatorial spectrum auctions typically happen once in several years
(Cramton [2013]). Within this time frame the technology can change dramatically
making it impractical for the bidders to misreport their bids based on the expected
outcome of one of the future auctions.
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fixed costs for producing their databases; (2) the databases can be
complementary for the buyers, i.e., joining two databases generates
some additional value for the buyers; (3) buyers and sellers arrive
to the market over time and can strategically decide when to arrive.
We adopt a similar approach as proposed by Moor et al. [2019],
i.e., we design a market that aims at optimizing the surplus of
buyers while guaranteeing that the sellers’ costs for producing
their databases are compensated. In contrast to [Moor et al. 2019],
we design a market that uses posted prices for both sellers and
buyers. The rationale for this design decision is twofold. On the one
hand, the market with posted prices has a very simple interface for
possibly non-sophisticated buyers and sellers. On the other hand,
the restriction of using the posted prices results in a much simpler
strategic behavior of buyers and sellers. Indeed, in this case, they
do not have to compute their optimal bid but can simply respond
to the proposed posted prices.2
The market platform in our market plays the role of a regulator,
i.e., it decides on which sellers to allocate, which queries to execute
and how much the buyers need to pay to the sellers. Thus, on the
one hand, the market platform computes payments for the sellers
and allows the sellers to respond to these payments. If the seller’s
cost is smaller than the proposed payment, then the seller gets
allocated, i.e., she creates and delivers her database to the market
platform. On the other hand, the market platform computes the
posted prices (per query) that are exposed to the buyers. The market
platform then receives the buyers’ queries, executes them, collects
the respective amounts of money from the buyers and transfers
them to the sellers.
We demonstrate how to compute the payments suggested to the
sellers and the posted prices for the buyers in a way that neither
sellers nor buyers have an incentive to strategically delay their
arrival or misreport their costs or values. This guarantees dynamic
incentive compatibility. Furthermore, we argue that while the tradi-
tional notion of budget balancedness is incompatible with dynamic
incentive compatibility, our market design still satisfies zero ex-
pected average budget deficit. In other words, we show that, as the
number of databases grows, the expected budget deficit per seller
decreases to zero. Finally, we validate our approach via simulations.
2 FORMAL MODEL
We assume that time is discrete and we consider an infinite horizon
problem where t = 0, 1, 2, ...,∞ are the consecutive time steps. We
let N ∈ N be the maximum number of databases that the market
platform can allocate.
Sellers. Data providers arrive to the market independently at
different time steps. At every time step at most one data provider
with the new database can arrive with probability r .3 Each data
provider can produce a single database.
We let θi = ⟨ai , ci ⟩ be the type of the data provider i . Here,
ai ∈ N is the arrival time of the data provider, i.e., the time step
when the data provider obtains her data; ci is the fixed cost that the
data provider incurs for producing the database out of her data. We
assume that all ci are drawn independently from the cumulative
2In what follows we will use the word (posted) payments for sellers and posted prices
for buyers.
3In practice, this can be achieved by making time intervals small enough. Considering
a continuous time model with a Poisson arrival process is a possible future extension.
distribution F (c), f (c) is the corresponding density function. We
assume that ci includes mainly the labor cost for producing the
database, i.e., costs for setting up the database, structuring the
data, linking the data against other existing databases, etc.4 We
assume that θi is a private knowledge of the data provider and let
θˆi = ⟨aˆi , cˆi ⟩ be the reported type of the data provider.
Consider the data provider i who obtains her data at time t ,
i.e., ai = t . This data provider can decide to structure her data
and to produce a database. We assume that the database can be
produced immediately after the data provider gets her data. As the
data provider is strategic, she can decide to deliver her database to
the market at a different reported arrival time aˆi , ai if she expects
to be better off by doing so. We impose the following assumption
on early arrivals:
Assumption 1 (Sellers’ Limited Misreports). For every data
provider i it must hold aˆi ≥ ai .
This assumption is not too restrictive as data providers cannot
produce and deliver their databases before they obtain the actual
data (which happens at time t ).
Let Xt ∈ N denote the number of databases allocated at time t ,
X0 = 0. Also, let p(Xt ) be the payment that the market platform is
willing to pay for the new database when Xt − 1 databases have
already been allocated. Then,
Xt+1 = Xt +
∑
θˆi : aˆi=t+1
1{cˆi ≤ p(Xt + 1)}.
Informally, this means that a new database is allocated at time t + 1
if there is an arrival of a new data provider at time t + 1 and the
cost of the data provider is not larger than the payment p(Xt + 1)
proposed by the market platform.
We assume that data providers have quasi-linear utility functions,
i.e., the present value of the utility of the data provider i who
obtains her data at time ai but decides to deliver it at time aˆi is
ui (θi , θˆi ) = −ci +δ aˆi−aip(Xaˆi ); here p(Xaˆi ) is the payment paid by
the market platform to the data provider; δ ∈ (0, 1) is the constant
discount rate for money. 5
Buyers. Generally speaking, at every time step multiple buyers
with different queries can arrive. Each buyer is willing to pay a
certain amount of money for an answer for his query. To keep our
model simple, instead of considering the demand of each buyer
separately, we consider an aggregate demand of all buyers. In other
words, we assume that at every time step there is a single risk-
neutral aggregate buyer willing to get an answer for his question
by submitting a query. In what follows, we will always refer to the
aggregate buyer as simply a “buyer".
A buyer who arrives with his question at time t can strategically
submit his query late at time tˆ , t if he expects to be better off by
doing so. We assume that the buyer cannot submit his query before
he gets his question to ask:
Assumption 2 (Buyers’ Limited Misreports). Buyers cannot
arrive earlier, i.e., tˆ ≥ t .
4We assume zero marginal costs, i.e., the electricity costs, the costs of maintaining the
data, etc.
5Notice, that the sellers discount only their future payments but not the costs. This
follows from the fact that these are the “labor" costs and must be indexed over time
with the same rate δ (i.e., ci is the constant present value of the future labor costs).
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In this setting, the instantaneous utility of the buyer who gets
his question at time t but submits his query at time tˆ is Ut (tˆ) =
γ tˆ−t
(
V (X tˆ ) − τtˆ (X tˆ )
)
, where γ ∈ [0,δ ) is the discount factor for
the buyer’s utility;6 τtˆ (X tˆ ) is the posted price faced by the buyer at
time tˆ if X tˆ databases are allocated. Observe that in our setting, the
posted prices τt (Xt ) depend on the number of allocated databases
and thus, constitute a stochastic process (see Section 4 for more
details). The expected value V (.) of the buyer for the answer for
his query depends on the number of allocated databases Xt . We
assume that V (.) is concave and strictly increasing. This reflects
the fact that the larger is the number of available databases, the
more informative (and thus, valuable) an answer for the buyer’s
query can be. Furthermore, the marginal value of an additional data-
base becomes smaller as the number of allocated databases grows.
Thus, such a shape of V (.) captures the complementarity aspect
of the buyers’ preferences and the diminishing value of additional
databases. Important here is that all databases are assumed to be
homogeneous, i.e., they have similar values for possibly different
groups of individual buyers. This assumption excludes the “junk"
data, i.e., the data that has no value for any individual buyer. We
elaborate on this value model and show how such an aggregate
buyer can be constructed in Appendix B. We also assume that V (.)
is known by the market platform.7
Remark 1. In practice, the value of each individual (not aggregate)
buyer for his query can depend not only on the number of allocated
databases Xt but also on the identities of those databases. While these
preferences of individual buyers may be very diverse (and generally
unknown), the aggregate preferences are typically much simpler to
predict. This idea was discussed by Bakos and Brynjolfsson [1999]
who suggested bundling of information goods as a way to obtain
consumers’ valuations for those goods. With this interpretation, in our
model the buyers pay for an access to a bundle of databases. Under
mild assumptions one can let the value of the buyers for such an access
be concave and strictly increasing in the number of databases in the
bundle.
Market Platform. Our design relies on modeling the dynamics
of the market via a Markov chain. The states of this Markov chain
correspond to different numbers of allocated databases. The transi-
tion probabilities are defined by the arrival rates of the sellers and
the payments suggested by the market platform to the sellers. To
compute these payments, we adopt a similar approach as proposed
by Moor et al. [2019], i.e., we aim at optimizing the total expected
future discounted utility of buyers while guaranteeing that the fixed
costs of the allocated sellers are compensated. The rationale for
such a market design objective comes from the fact that in data
markets, the sellers can be “monopolists" for their data. Thus, the
market platform should play the role of a regulator that prevents
the rent extracting behavior of the sellers (see Moor et al. [2019]).
Formally, we can think about our market platform as a Markov
chain with N + 1 states. A state is characterized by the number
6 Buyers are typically not willing to wait for a long time before getting their queries
answered. Consequently, γ is normally much smaller than δ . We also assume that γ
is a common knowledge.
7Similarly to [Moor et al. 2019], the buyers’ side of themarket is thick and one can easily
sample buyers to learn their valuations. In practice, such learning can be performed by
the market platform by iteratively updating its belief about V (.) when observing the
responses of the buyers for the posted prices. The design of the respective learning
procedure, however, is outside the scope of this paper.
of databases being allocated at this state. Assume that at time t
the market platform is in the state Xt ∈ {0, 1, ...,N }. At this state,
the market platform announces the payment p(Xt + 1) for the
seller arriving next. Data providers observe the proposed payments
and decide whether to produce their databases. We set explicitly
p(N + 1) = 0 to indicate that in the terminal state, no further
databases can be allocated.
We impose a number of constraints on our market design.
Definition 1 (DIC for Sellers). The mechanism is dynamic
incentive compatible for sellers if for any seller i and ∀θi , θˆi that
satisfy Assumption 1 we have ui (θi ,θi ) ≥ EXaˆi [ui (θi , θˆi )|Xai ].
In words, we say that the mechanism is dynamic incentive com-
patible for sellers, if neither seller can expect to get a higher utility at
any of the future states Xaˆi by misreporting her cost or by delaying
her arrival.
Definition 2 (DIC for Buyers). The mechanism is dynamic
incentive compatible for buyers if ∃t∗ > 0 s.t., for any t ≥ t∗ we
haveUt (t) ≥ EX tˆ [Ut (tˆ)|Xt ] for any tˆ that satisfy Assumption 2.
In words, we say that the mechanism is dynamic incentive com-
patible for buyers if once the market gets sufficiently large (i.e.,
many databases are available), the buyers cannot expect to get a
higher utility by delaying their arrival. The latter definition rules
out some corner cases that can occur when the market just starts op-
erating, i.e., during the interval [0, t∗]when only very few databases
are available.
Given these design constraints, we can now formally define the
transitions of the Markov chain. Let i, j be the states of the Markov
chain and let P = [Pi j ](N+1)×(N+1) be the stochastic transition
matrix of this Markov chain with
Pi j =

rF
(
p(i + 1)), if j = i + 1
1 − rF (p(i + 1)), if j = i
0, otherwise.
(1)
Thus, the Markov chain transitions from the state i to the state i + 1
if there is an arrival of a seller (with probability r ) and the cost of
the seller is not larger than the payment proposed to this seller
(which happens with probability F
(
p(i + 1))). Let Pn = P · Pn−1,
n = 2, 3, ....
A commonly used property of budget balancedness (see, e.g.,
Mas-Colell et al. [1995]) can be informally stated as follows: A
mechanism is budget balanced if the total amount of money paid to
the sellers net the total amount collected from the buyers is equal to
zero. Observe that in our setting, the notion of budget balancedness
is not compatible with DIC for Buyers. Indeed, assume that at some
time step the posted price for the buyer is τ0 > 0 and allN databases
are already allocated. If at some time step t∗ > 0 the mechanism is
budget balanced, then for any ϵ > 0 and for any t ≥ t∗ the amount
of money that should be collected from buyers is smaller than ϵ .
Let us choose ϵ < τ0. Then, the posted price at any time t ≥ t∗
must be smaller than ϵ and consequently, smaller than τ0. Thus, the
buyer who does not discount the future strongly (i.e., γ ≈ 1) would
always prefer to wait until t∗ to submit his query. This violates the
DIC for Buyers.
Thus, instead of focusing on the traditional notion of budget
balancedness, we aim at achieving zero expected average budget
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deficit, i.e., we show that the shortfall per seller decreases as the
number of databases increases.We can define this property formally
in the following way: Let p˜(t) be the present value (at time t ) of
all the past payments that have been already paid to the allocated
sellers up to time t . Similarly, let τ˜ (t) be the present value of all the
payments made by the buyers up to time t . Thus, the budget deficit
at time t can be defined as BD(t) = p˜(t) − τ˜ (t).
Definition 3 (Expected Budget Deficit). The expected budget
deficit is
E[BD] = lim
t→∞Eθi [BD(t)],
where the expectation is over different types of sellers θi .
In words, the expected budget deficit is equal to the expected
residual amount of money that even in the limit cannot be col-
lected from the buyers to fully compensate the sellers. Zero average
expected budget deficit requires that this loss per-seller becomes
negligibly small as the market grows, i.e.,
Definition 4 (Zero Expected Av. Budget Deficit). The mech-
anism has zero average expected budget deficit if
lim
N→∞
E[BD]
N
= 0.
The mechanism we propose maximizes the expected surplus
of buyers and, thus, must be individually rational for buyers in
expectation. It is also individually rational for sellers as they can
always opt-out if the proposed payment is smaller than their cost.
3 COMPUTING PAYMENTS TO SELLERS
Remember that the market platform maximizes the total expected
future discounted surplus of buyers. Let ν∗k be the maximal expected
total future discounted surplus of buyers when k databases are
already allocated. Consider the Bellman equations for the market
platform:
ν∗N =
V (N )
1 − γ (2)
ν∗k−1 = maxp(k)
{
V (k − 1) + γrF (p(k)) (ν∗k − p(k)) (3)
+
(
1 − rF (p(k)) )γν∗k−1}
for k = 1, ...,N . Informally, the maximal expected total future
discounted surplus of buyers in the state k − 1 of the Markov chain
is equal to the immediate “reward" in this state, i.e., V (k − 1), plus
the discounted expected future maximal surplus in the next state.
The latter depends on whether the Markov chain stays in the state
k − 1 (i.e., if no allocation happens) or if it transitions to the state k .
The first-order conditions imply
ν∗k − p∗(k) − ν∗k−1 =
F
(
p∗(k))
f
(
p∗(k)) . (4)
Now, we can rewrite
ν∗k−1 = V (k − 1) + rγ
F 2(p∗(k))
f (p∗(k)) + γν
∗
k−1 (5)
Equations (4) and (5) constitute a system of 2N non-linear equations
with 2N unknowns.8 The solution of these equations gives us the
8We solve it with the Newton method.
payments for sellers p∗(k) at every state k of the Markov chains
(along with the values ν∗k ).
Now, we claim that the sellers have no incentive to arrive late.
This follows from the fact that in such a setting the payments
proposed by the market platform can only decrease with time. This
proves dynamic incentive compatibility for sellers. The following
theorem states this formally.
Definition 5. We say that a distribution f (c) is strongly regu-
lar if F (c)f (c) is monotone and strictly increasing.
Theorem 1. If f (.) is strongly regular, then the mechanism is
dynamic incentive compatible for sellers.
Proof. Wefirst show that if f (.) is strongly regular, thenp(1),p(2), ...
weakly decreases with time. The Bellman equations can be rewrit-
ten as follows:
ν∗k−1 − ν∗k−2 =
1
1 − γ
[
V (k − 1) −V (k − 2)+
γr
( F 2 (p∗(k))
f
(
p∗(k)) − F 2
(
p∗(k − 1))
f
(
p∗(k − 1)) )]
for k = 1, ...,N . Using Equation (4) we can rewrite:
p∗(k − 1) + F
(
p∗(k − 1))
f
(
p∗(k − 1)) + γr1 − γ F 2
(
p∗(k − 1))
f
(
p∗(k − 1)) =
1
1 − γ
[
V (k − 1) −V (k − 2) + γr F
2 (p∗(k))
f
(
p∗(k)) ] .
By induction, we see thatp(N+1) = 0,p(N ) > 0; the l.h.s. is a strictly
increasing function while the r.h.s. gets larger as k → 0 (due to the
concavity of V (.) and the induction hypothesis p∗(k) ≥ p∗(k + 1)).
Thus, the solution for p∗(k − 1) must also get larger as k → 0, i.e.,
p∗(k − 1) ≥ p∗(k).
Finally, for any θi , θˆi that satisfy Assumption 1 we have
ui (θi , θˆi ) = −ci + δ aˆi−aip(Xaˆi ) ≤ −ci + δ aˆi−aip(Xai )
≤ −ci + p(Xai ) = ui (θi ,θi ).
Q.E.D. 
4 COMPUTING PRICES FOR BUYERS
Observe that if we set the posted prices for the buyer equal to the
payments for sellers, i.e., τt (Xt ) = p(Xt ), then the mechanism can-
not satisfy DIC for Buyers. Indeed, as we have shown in Theorem
1, the payments p(Xt ) can only decrease with time. In this case, the
posted price would also only decrease. This would incentivize the
buyers to arrive late which violates DIC for Buyers. Therefore, we
need to disentangle the posted prices exposed to the buyer from
the payments paid to the sellers. There are two main requirements
to constructing such posted prices:
R1. The posted prices τt must guarantee DIC for Buyers;
R2. τt and p(Xt ) must satisfy zero expected average budget
deficit.
In this section, we show how to construct a pricing scheme satisfy-
ing these two requirements.
First, the solution of Equations (4) and (5) allows us to compute
the transition matrix P as defined in Equation (1). Now, let π˜ (k)
denote the present value of the future total payment to sellers when
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the Markov chain is in the state k . Thus, for each k we can compute
the expected value of π˜ (k) at this state as follows:
E[π˜ (k)] =δrF (p(k + 1))(p(k + 1) + E[π˜ (k + 1)])+ (6)
δ
(
1 − rF (p(k + 1)) )E[π˜ (k)], ∀k = 0, 1, ...,N .
In words, if the Markov chain is in the state k , then two things can
happen. Either an allocation happens, and therefore, the Markov
chain transitions to the state k + 1. In this case, the market platform
must make an “immediate" payment p(k + 1) and expects to make a
future payment of E[π˜ (k + 1)]. Alternatively, no allocation happens.
In this case, the market platform stays in the state k and expects
to make a future payment of E[π˜ (k)]. Thus, the present value of
the expected future total payment to the sellers in state k is equal
to the discounted convex combination of the two aforementioned
terms. Equations (6) constitute a system of N + 1 linear equations
with N + 1 unknowns E[π˜ (k)], k = 0, ...,N .
Now remember, that Pni j is the probability that the Markov chain
transitions from the state i to the state j within n time intervals.
Thus, to satisfy the requirement R1 at time t = 0 we must have
τ0(0) + δ
(
P00τ1(0) + P01τ1(1) + ...
)
+ (7)
δ2
(
P200τ2(0) + P201τ2(1) + P202τ2(2) + ...
)
+ ... = E[π˜ (0)].
To satisfy the requirement R2 we compute the prices in a way
that at any time step t and any allocation of databases Xt at time
t , the expected future posted price at any possible future time
interval is equal to the current posted price (i.e. to the posted price
at time t ). Thus, for t = 0 we set P00τ1(0) + P01τ1(1) + ... = τ0(0),
(P200τ2(0)+ P201τ2(1)+ P202τ2(2)+ ...) = τ0(0) etc. for any tˆ > t . Now,
we can simplify the Equation (7): τ0(0) = (1 − δ )E[π˜ (0)]. Generally,
if at time t the Markov chain is in the state k , we set
τt (k) = (1 − δ )
(
E[π˜ (k)] + p˜(t) − τ˜ (t − 1)
δ
)
. (8)
Finally, the overall mechanism looks as follows:
Dynamic Data Market Mechanism
Payments to Sellers: At time t = 0, solve Equations (4) and (5):
ν∗k−1 = V (k − 1) + rγ
F 2(p∗(k))
f (p∗(k)) + γν
∗
k−1,
ν∗k − p∗(k) − ν∗k−1 =
F
(
p∗(k))
f
(
p∗(k)) , k = 1, ...,N .
Here, p∗(k) is the payment proposed by the market platform
for the k’th database, k = 1, ...,N .
Allocation of Sellers: At each time t > 0, a seller with cost ci
may arrive and respond to p∗(Xt−1 + 1). If ci ≤ p∗(Xt−1 + 1),
the seller is allocated, Xt = Xt−1 + 1. Otherwise, the seller is
not allocated, Xt = Xt−1.
Posted Prices for Buyers: At each time t , the market platform
computes the posted price for this interval according to Equa-
tion (8):
τt (Xt ) = (1 − δ )
(
E[π˜ (Xt )] + p˜(t) − τ˜ (t − 1)
δ
)
.
The dynamic incentive compatibility for buyers follows from the
following theorem.
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Figure 1: Payment for the i’th allocated database for differ-
ent arrival rates r of sellers.
Theorem 2. The process τt (Xt ) is a martingale.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
To complete the proof of DIC for Buyers, observe thatγV (Xt+1) ≤
γV (Xt + 1) = γ (V (Xt + 1) − V (Xt )) + γV (Xt ). From concavity
of V (.) it follows that as Xt gets sufficiently large, the difference
(V (Xt + 1) −V (Xt )) gets small. This fact together with Theorem
2 proves that if the market is large enough, the buyers do not get
more value from delaying their arrival. Formally,
E[Ut (tˆ = t + 1)|Xt ] =E[γV (Xt+1)|Xt ] − γE[τtˆ (X tˆ )|Xt ] ≤
γE[V (Xt + 1) −V (Xt )]︸                        ︷︷                        ︸
Goes to 0 as Xt grows.
+γUt (t).
Finally, the following theorem shows that the proposed mecha-
nism satisfies zero expected average budget deficit.
Theorem 3. The dynamic data market mechanism has zero ex-
pected average budget deficit.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
5 EXPERIMENTS
To validate our model, we carry out a number of simulations of the
proposed market under different simulation scenarios. We assume
that for all scenarios, the costs of sellers are drawn from the uniform
distribution, ci ∼ U [0, 1]. We further assume that the value of the
buyer is V (Xt ) =
√
Xt . The discount rate is δ = 0.9.
Payments for Sellers. First, we perform a simulationwithN = 100
databases while varying r and γ . Figure 1 illustrates the payment
p(i) for the newly arriving database i ≤ N when (i − 1) databases
are already allocated. Here, we vary r ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 1.0} while fixing
γ = 0.9. In line with our results proved in Theorem 1, the payments
decrease over time. From this figure, we also see that as the arrival
rate r gets smaller, the market platform suggests higher payments
to the sellers. This result follows form the fact that as the probability
of arrival of a seller decreases, the opportunity cost of the market
platform for waiting increases. Indeed, if at time t the seller does
not arrive, and Xt = Xt−1, then the buyer enjoys a smaller value
of V (Xt−1) instead of the value V (Xt−1 + 1) he could have enjoyed
if the seller arrived at time t and delivered her database. Thus, the
market platform “loses" the possible higher value of the buyer and
consequently, has a higher opportunity cost for waiting. Due to
the increased opportunity costs, the market platform increases the
payments.
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Figure 2: Payment for the i’th allocated database for differ-
ent discount factors γ of buyers.
Now, let us look into the dependency of the payments to the
sellers on the discount factor γ of the buyer. Figure 2 illustrates
the payments of the market platform for the i’th database when
(i − 1) databases are already allocated. Here, we fix r = 1 and vary
γ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}. The figure demonstrates that the stronger the
buyer discounts the future, the smaller the payments proposed to
the sellers by the market platform. The explanation of this phe-
nomenon comes from a similar opportunity cost argument: Indeed,
stronger discounting of the future value of the buyer decreases
the opportunity cost of “losing" the future buyer’s surplus. Thus,
the opportunity cost of not allocating the seller now gets smaller.
Consequently, the payments suggested by the market platform to
the sellers must also decrease.
Posted Prices for the Buyer. We illustrate the posted prices ex-
posed to the buyer by generating 10 trajectories corresponding to
the process τt (Xt ). To achieve this, we sample 10 different arrival
scenarios and costs ci . We set γ = 0.5, r = 1, N = 100. We then
let the simulated sellers arrive to the market and respond to the
suggested payments. At each time step t we compute the number of
allocated databases Xt as well as the posted price τt (Xt ) according
to Equation (8). Figure 3 (top) illustrates the different trajectories
corresponding to the martingale process of the posted price τt (Xt )
while Figure 3 (bottom) demonstrates the respective trajectories of
the process Xt . From comparing the Figure 3 (top) with the Figure
3 (bottom) we see that if an allocation does not happen at time
t (i.e., the trajectory of Xt has a plateau), then the posted price
τt (Xt ) decreases. If an allocation happens at time t , then there is a
respective spike in the posted price.
Expected Average Budget Deficit. We illustrate the convergence of
the expected average budget deficit, E[BD]N , to zero as the number of
allocated databases N grows. Figure 4 illustrates our findings. Here,
we sample 1000 different trajectories corresponding to different
arrivals and costs of sellers. We then compute the mean values and
the standard errors of the resulting expected average budget deficit.
As expected, the result goes in hand with our Theorem 3.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the dynamics of the combinatorial
data market. We proposed a mechanism that optimizes the expected
future discounted surplus of buyers while compensating the fixed
costs of allocated sellers and satisfying the two key properties: dy-
namic incentive compatibility and zero expected average budget
deficit. We further studied the proposed mechanism in a simula-
tion environment. Our results confirm our intuition regarding the
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Figure 3: Trajectories of the posted price τt (Xt ) (top) and the
number of allocated databases Xt (bottom). For every trajec-
tory Xt , the respective trajectory τt (Xt ) is depicted with the
same color.
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Figure 4: Expected Average Budget Deficit for different num-
bers of N . Here, r = 1, γ = 0.5.
changes in prices and in the budget deficit when slightly changing
the parameters of the mechanism. In future work, we are plan-
ning to expand these simulations and to study a number of further
economic properties of the proposed mechanism.
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A PROOFS
Lemma 1. For any state k = 0, ...,N the following inequality holds:
E[π˜ (k)] − E[π˜ (k + 1)] ≤ p(k + 1).
Proof. Follows from Equation (6). We can rewrite(
1 + 1 − δ
δrF
(
p(k + 1)) )E[π˜ (k)] − E[π˜ (k + 1)] = p(k + 1). (9)
Here, 1 + 1−δ
δ r F
(
p(k+1)
) ≥ 1. Therefore,
E[π˜ (k)] − E[π˜ (k + 1)] ≤ p(k + 1).

Lemma 2. For any time t > 0 it holds p˜(t) − τ˜ (t) > 0.
Proof. We proceed by induction. For t = 1, the payment p(1) is
maximal and the result holds, i.e., BD(1) = p(1) − τ0(0)δ − τ1(ℓ) > 0.
Consider an arbitrary time t > 1 and Xt = ℓ. We have
BD(t) = p˜(t) − τ˜ (t) = p˜(t) − τ˜ (t − 1)
δ
−
(1 − δ )
(
E[π˜ (ℓ)] + p˜(t) − τ˜ (t − 1)
δ
)
=
δp˜(t) − τ˜ (t − 1) − (1 − δ )E[π˜ (ℓ)] =
δ
(
p˜(t) − τ (t − 1)
δ
)
− (1 − δ )E[π˜ (ℓ)] =
δ
( p˜(t − 1)
δ
+ p(Xt ) − τ˜ (t − 1)
δ
)
− (1 − δ )E[π˜ (ℓ)] =
BD(t − 1) + δp(Xt ) − (1 − δ )E[π˜ (ℓ)].
Now, consider two cases: p(Xt ) = p(ℓ) and p(Xt ) = p(ℓ + 1) (i.e.,
dependent on whether there is an allocation has happened at time
t ).
In the former case, using Equation (9) we can rewrite:
BD(t) =BD(t − 1) +
(
δ +
1 − δ
rF
(
p(ℓ)) )E[π˜ (ℓ − 1)]−
δE[π˜ (ℓ)] − (1 − δ )E[π˜ (ℓ)] =
BD(t − 1) +
(
δ +
1 − δ
rF
(
p(ℓ)) )E[π˜ (ℓ − 1)] − E[π˜ (ℓ)]
≥ BD(t − 1) ≥ 0.
In the latter case,
BD(t) =BD(t − 1) +
(
δ +
1 − δ
rF
(
p(ℓ)) )E[π˜ (ℓ)]−
δE[π˜ (ℓ + 1)] − (1 − δ )E[π˜ (ℓ)] =
BD(t − 1) +
(
δ +
1 − δ
rF
(
p(ℓ)) − (1 − δ ))E[π˜ (ℓ)]−
δE[π˜ (ℓ + 1)] ≥ BD(t − 1) ≥ 0.
Q.E.D. 
Theorem 3 1. The mechanism has zero expected average budget
deficit.
Proof. Let us consider the budget deficit at time t , i.e., BD(t) =
p˜(t) − τ˜ (t). We know that BD(0) = 0 − τ˜ (0) = −(1 − δ )E[π˜ (0)]. The
expected budget deficit at time t = 1 is
E[BD(1)] =rF (p(1)) (p(1) − τ1(1)) − τ0(0)
δ
−
(
1 − rF (p(1)) )τ1(0) =
rF
(
p(1)) (p(1) − τ1(1) + τ1(0)) − τ0(0)
δ
− τ1(0).
Observe, that τ1(1) = τ1(0)+ (1−δ )(p(1)+E[π˜ (1)]−E[π˜ (0)]). Thus,
we can rewrite
E[BD(1)] = rF (p(1)) (p(1) − (1 − δ )(p(1) + E[π˜ (1)] − E[π˜ (0)]))−
τ0(0)
δ
− τ1(0) =
rF
(
p(1)) (E[π˜ (0)] − E[π˜ (1)]) + δrF (p(1)) (p(1) + E[π˜ (1)])−
δrF
(
p(1))E[π˜ (0)] − τ0(0)
δ
− τ1(0) =
rF
(
p(1)) (E[π˜ (0)] − E[π˜ (1)]) + δrF (p(1)) (p(1) + E[π˜ (1)])+
δ
(
1 − rF (p(1)) )E[π˜ (0)]
−δE[π˜ (0)] − τ0(0)
δ
− (1 − δ )
(
E[π˜ (0)] − τ0(0)
δ
)
= rF
(
p(1)) (E[π˜ (0)] − E[π˜ (1)]) + BD(0).
From Lemma 1 it follows that E[BD(1)] ≤ BD(0) + rF (p(1))p(1).
Now, consider the expected budget deficit at time t > 1:
E[BD(t)] =E[BD(t − 1)]+∑
ℓ
Pr(state = ℓ)
[
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1))(p(ℓ + 1) − τt (ℓ + 1))+(
1 − rF (p(ℓ + 1)) )(−τt (ℓ))] .
Observe, that
τt (ℓ + 1) = τt (ℓ) + (1 − δ )
(
E[π˜ (ℓ + 1)] − E[π˜ (ℓ)] + p(ℓ + 1)
)
.
Thus, we can rewrite
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1)) (p(ℓ + 1) − τt (ℓ + 1))+(
1 − rF (p(ℓ + 1)) )( − τt (ℓ)) =
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1)) (p(ℓ + 1) − τt (ℓ + 1) + τt (ℓ)) − τt (ℓ) =
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1)) (δp(ℓ + 1) − (1 − δ )(E[π˜ (ℓ + 1)] − E[π˜ (ℓ)]))
− τt (ℓ) =
NetEcon’19, June 28, 2019, Phoenix, AZ, USA Moor
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1)) (E[π˜ (ℓ)] − E[π˜ (ℓ + 1)])+
δrF
(
p(ℓ + 1)) (p(ℓ + 1) + E[π˜ (ℓ + 1)])+
δ
(
1 − rF (p(ℓ + 1)) )E[π˜ (ℓ)] − δE[π˜ (ℓ)] − τt (ℓ) =
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1)) (E[π˜ (ℓ)] − E[π˜ (ℓ + 1)])+
E[π˜ (ℓ)](1 − δ ) − τt (ℓ) ≤
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1)) (E[π˜ (ℓ)] − E[π˜ (ℓ + 1)]) − 1 − δ
δ
BD(t − 1) <
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1)) (E[π˜ (ℓ)] − E[π˜ (ℓ + 1)]) .
Here, the last inequality follows directly from Lemma 2. Now, we
can rewrite
E[BD(t)] < E[BD(t − 1)]+
max
ℓ
{
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1)) (E[π˜ (ℓ)] − E[π˜ (ℓ + 1)])} ≤
E[BD(t − 1)] +max
ℓ
{
rF
(
p(ℓ + 1))p(ℓ + 1)}.
Which implies that the expected budget deficit grows slower than
linearly. Thus,
lim
N→∞
E[BD(t)]
N
= 0.
Q.E.D. 
Theorem 2 1. The process τ1(X1),τ2(X2), ... is a martingale.
Proof. Let Xt = s . We want to show that E[τt+1(ℓ)|s] = τt (s).
Precisely,
E[τt+1(ℓ)|s] = rF
(
p(s + 1))τt+1(s + 1)+(
1 − rF (p(s + 1)) )τt+1(s) =
(1 − δ )
[
rF
(
p(s + 1)) (E[π˜ (s + 1)] + p˜(t)
δ
+ p(s + 1) − τ˜ (t)
)
+
(
1 − rF (p(s + 1)) ) (E[π˜ (s)] + p˜(t)
δ
− τ˜ (t)
)]
=
(1 − δ )
[
rF
(
p(s + 1)) (E[π˜ (s + 1)] + p(s + 1))+(
1 − rF (p(s + 1)) )E[π˜ (s)] + p˜(t)
δ
− τ˜ (t)
]
=
(1 − δ )
[E[π˜ (s)]
δ
+
p˜(t)
δ
− τ˜ (t)
]
=
1 − δ
δ
[
E[π˜ (s)] + p˜(t) − δτ˜ (t − 1) − τt (s)
]
=
1 − δ
δ
[ τt (s)
1 − δ − τt (s)
]
= τt (s).
Q.E.D. 
B VALUE MODEL
We assume that buyers can acquire data to make certain predictions
about the state of the world. If the prediction of a buyer is good, then
he gets a high reward RH ∈ R+. Otherwise, the buyer receives a
low reward RL ∈ R+, RL < RH .9 For simplicity, we assume that the
reward is the same for all buyers. Due to the inherent uncertainty
9This is similar to the model of Bergemann et al. [2018].
about the world, a buyer without any additional information faces
a lottery in which he can obtain the high reward with Pr(RH ) =
P˜0 or the low reward with Pr(RL) = 1 − P˜0. Let RN denote the
expected reward of buyers when N databases are allocated. Thus,
the expected reward of the buyer who does not acquire any data is
R0 = P˜0RH + (1 − P˜0)RL . (10)
We assume that if the buyer can make a better prediction about
the state of the world, then he has a higher chance to receive the
high reward. Thus, in order to improve his prediction, the buyer
can purchase data by submitting a query against one or multiple
databases.
We let P˜i be the probability that i = 0, 1, 2, ... databases joined
together allow the buyer to make a good prediction of the state
of the world (and consequently, to receive the high reward RH ).
Thus, the fraction of buyers who can receive the high reward RH by
querying a single available database is P˜1. Similarly, the fraction of
buyers who are interested in joining exactly two available databases
is P˜2, etc. Implicit here is the homogeneity assumption, i.e., the
assumption that this probability does not depend on identities of
the databases. For example, if there are two databases available for
the buyers, then the fraction P˜1 of all buyers can receive the high
reward by querying only against the first database, and the fraction
P˜1 of buyers can get the high reward by querying only against the
second database. Naturally, these two subsets can overlap if the data
is substitutable for the buyers.10 However, we restrict our attention
to the case when the queries themselves are fixed. This means that
if the buyer wants to join two databases, he can only decide on the
databases to join, but cannot decide to join three databases. Notice
also, that typically the number of different databases N is much
larger than the number of databases relevant for answering each
buyer’s query.
Inwhat follows, we show that as the number of available databases
N increases, the aggregate value of buyers for a yet another data-
base also increases. Generally speaking, allocating an additional
complementary database may result in either concave or convex
aggregate value function V (.). However, we demonstrate that for
larger numbers of N , the aggregate value function V (.) must be
concave. This follows from the fact, that as N grows, the buyers
still typically join only a very small number of databases compared
to N . Therefore, there is no exponential growth in the values of
buyers for answers for their queries on average.
Joining up to two databases, i ≤ 2. First, consider the case when
there is only a single database available for buyers (i.e., N = 1). In
this case, R1 = P˜1RH + (1 − P˜1)R0. Consequently, the willingness
of the buyers to pay for this database is
ω(1) = R1 − R0 = P˜1(RH − R0). (11)
Let us now consider the casewhen buyers can access two databases
(i.e., N = 2). In this case, the probability to get the high reward
is Pr(RH ) = (2P˜1 − P˜12) + P˜2, where the first term corresponds to
the fraction of buyers who submit queries against a single data-
base, and the second term corresponds to the fraction of buyers
who need to join both databases to make a good prediction. Thus,
10This model obviously excludes the case of the “junk" data, i.e., the data that is not
valued by any buyer.
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R2 = (2P˜1 − P˜12 + P˜2)RH +
(
1 − (2P˜1 − P˜12 + P˜2)
)
R0. Therefore, the
willingness of buyers to pay for the second database is
ω(2) = R2 − R1 =
(
P˜1(1 − P˜1) + P˜2
)(RH − R0). (12)
Observe, that if P˜2 ≤ P˜21 , then ω(2) ≤ ω(1). Intuitively, this means
that if the two databases are not strongly complementary, the value
function V (.) is still concave even for small N . However, if the two
databases are strong complements (i.e., P˜2 > P˜21 ), then concavity
of V (.) can be violated for small N . Nevertheless, as we show next,
the value function V (.) is still concave for large N .
Generally, for any k > 2 we have
ω(k) =
[
P˜1(1 − P˜1)k−1 + (1 − P˜2)C2k−1 P˜2
k−1∑
j=1
(1 − P˜2)j−1
]
(RH − R0).
(13)
The intuition behind this formula is as follows. If there are already
k−1 databases allocated, then there are two kinds of buyers who can
benefit from allocating the k ′th database. The first kind corresponds
to the buyers who are willing to access only the new k ′th database
and who have not benefited from accessing any of the previously
allocated k − 1 databases. The fraction of such buyers is P˜1(1 −
P˜1)k−1. The second kind corresponds to the buyers who want to
join two databases and who could not benefit from joining any two
of k − 1 already allocated databases. The fraction of such buyers is
(1− P˜2)C2k−1 P˜2∑k−1j=1 (1− P˜2)j−1. Naturally, the buyers of both kinds
are willing to pay up to RH − R0 for the new database.
From Equation (13) it follows that the willingness to pay for
the k ′th database decreases as k increases. Indeed, the chance that
none of the available individual databases are helpful for the buyers
gets smaller as the number of databases increases. Observe also
that there are C2k−1 = (k − 1)(k − 2)/2 possible ways to join two
out of k − 1 databases that are already available. Allocating the
k ′th database leads to k − 1 additional ways to join the data (and
therefore leads to a higher potential reward). However, the chance
that none of the already available C2k−1 combinations is helpful for
the buyers gets very small much faster than the linear growth due
in the new combinations to join the data.
Joining up to ℓ databases, i ≤ ℓ. In this case, we have
ω(k) =
ℓ∑
i=1
P˜i (1 − P˜i )C ik−1 ·
C i−1k−1∑
j=1
(1 − P˜i )j−1. (14)
The analysis performed in the previous paragraph extends to this
setting.
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